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Using the most recent purchasing power parity data for 
44 sub-Saharan African countries, this paper examines 
the characteristics of long run growth in Africa between 
1975 and 2005. The authors find that low and volatile 
growth is the outstanding defining characteristic of 
Africa’s growth experience since 1975, but the authors 
find no evidence that growth volatility is associated with 
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economic performance over the long run. The authors 
also find that the 1990s may mark a turning point in 
Africa’s growth; income distribution is becoming more 
unequal across countries; formation of clubs; initial 
conditions matter a great deal for income distribution but 
not for growth; and that geography and natural resources 
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1. Introduction 
  Recent popular and academic writing has suggested that Africa may be at a 
turning point in its long economic decline (Ndulu et al. 2006; Commission for Africa 
2005). Beginning about the middle of the 1990s, growth accelerated in a number of 
countries, and the region’s average growth rate began to approach that of other 
developing countries for the first time since the mid-1970s. To understand whether Africa 
is at a turning point, however, it is useful to understand the stylized facts of the region’s 
post-independence long-run growth performance.   
  Using the most recent purchasing power parity (PPP) data for 44 sub-Saharan 
African countries, this paper examines the characteristics of long-run growth in Africa 
between 1975 and 2005. We were interested in examining the following issues: cross-
country income structure, convergence, the country-level distribution of income, and 
growth persistence. Also, we examined the data for evidence of the formation of country 
groups or “clubs.” 
The time period includes the first oil shock and commodities prices plunge, when 
many African economies collapsed and several conflicts erupted; the introduction of 
structural reforms, which brought significant changes in many economies; and the growth 
recovery observed more recently. Given the rich and varied economic changes 
experienced by African countries, our time-series may well capture long-term economic 
trends.   
  The next section describes our data and methods and is followed by a section 
examining the characteristics of Africa’s long-run growth experience. The fourth section 
of the paper looks at the structure of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita across 
Africa. We then identify four groups of countries according to their income levels and 
growth experiences, and we look for some common characteristics that are associated 
with the groups. Next, we probe more deeply into the consequences of growth volatility 
for economic performance and test for some correlates of volatility.   
2. Data and methods 
We analyzed patterns of GDP per capita growth at 2000 international PPP prices 
and their respective standard deviations (SDs) and coefficients of variation (CVs), which 
are our measures of volatility. Although there are differences between GDP per capita at   3
PPP and non-PPP, those differences mainly are confined to levels and do not affect 
growth trajectories.
1 
All data are from World Development Indicators, unless otherwise specified. The 
time-series spans the years 1975 to 2005. Our sample contains all sub-Saharan African 
countries for which PPP GDP data exist. For Liberia, San Tomé and Principe, and 
Somalia, there are no GDP per capita PPP data.
2  We have an unbalanced panel of data 
with 44 countries and 31 periods. The mean GDP per capita between 1975 and 2005, 
using unweighted data, was $2,306 for the 44 countries in our sample. The mean GDP 
using weighted data was $1,702. Unless stated otherwise, we used unweighted country 
data because we are interested in examining the representative country.
3 
Along with descriptive statistics and kernel distributions, we analyzed the GDP 
data using bivariate and multivariate cross-country and pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression models and multivariate logit models. Because we are interested in 
identifying the long-run association between growth and other variables, rather than in 
modeling the determinants of growth, we are not concerned about omitted variables and 
problems associated with direction of causality, reverse causality, endogeneities, 
nonlinearities, and other potential econometric issues that usually plague growth 
regressions. We interpret our econometric results descriptively only.   
3. Characteristics of Africa’s long run growth 
Figure 1a shows that mean GDP per capita had a slow, positive long-term trend, 
consisting of about 20 years of virtual stagnation with a point of inflexion in the early 
1990s.
4  Since the mid-1990s, the variance of mean income per capita also appears to 
have declined. Weighting by GDP (figure 1b) gives a U-shaped pattern of GDP per 
capita, reaching a minimum in the mid-1990s. By 2005, GDP per capita had not yet 
recovered to the levels observed in mid-1970s. 
                                                 
1 Figure A1 and Table A1 in the Appendix show that PPP and non-PPP growth data share similar statistical 
properties. 
2 Our sample accounted for 98.4% of population and 99% of regional GDP as of 2005. 
3 Although Equatorial Guinea is in our sample, we removed the country from all charts, tables, 
econometrics, and aggregate descriptive statistics because its extremely high growth rates in recent years 
distort the results.   
4 We employ the Hodrick-Prescott filter in Figures 1 and 2 to smooth the estimate of the long term trend 
component of the GDP series.   4
The trajectories of the unweighted and weighted series show significant 
differences. Africa’s larger economies stagnated or declined in the 1970s and 1980s, 
causing the U shape. South Africa, which represents, on average, 42 percent of the 
regions’ GDP, grew by an average of only 0.12 percent a year; and Nigeria, the second-
largest economy, representing 13.50 percent of the region’s GDP, grew by 0.28 percent, 
while the regional unweighted average growth was 0.71 percent. Both the unweighted 
and weighted series show a strong positive trend from the mid-1990s on. In the period 
1995–2005, the unweighted average GDP per capita growth was 1.81 percent, more than 
twice the long-term average. 
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Figure 1b: Weighted data
 
Turning to growth rates, figure 2 presents the paths of unweighted and weighted 
data. The mean and SD of unweighted GDP per capita growth are 0.71 percent and 6.32 
percent, respectively. Figure 2a shows that growth declined until the mid-1980s, but it 
has had a positive trend since then. The mean and SD of weighted data are –0.17 percent   5
and 1.7 percent, respectively. Although the trend line shapes appear similar, their means 
and variances are significantly different. The mean calculated from unweighted data is 
larger, suggesting that big economies grew less than small ones, as indicated above. Both 
small and large economies experienced high growth variation, however. The average SD 
of South Africa’s growth is 2.41 percent; Nigeria’s average is 5.15 percent; and the 
simple average of African countries is 2.26 percent. 
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Figure 2b: Weighted data
 
Comparing Sub-Saharan Africa with Other Developing Regions 
The African growth story looks bleak when compared with the growth 
performances of other developing countries. Whereas all other regions experienced 
significant income improvements, Africa’s income shrank between the 1970s and the 
2000s (see table 1). Africa is always among the weakest growth performers, although 
there has been some catching up recently.     6
Region 1975-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05
Sub-Saharan Africa 1,928 1,844 1,782 1,648 1,668 1,768
East Asia & Pacific 905 1,227 1,686 2,407 3,399 4,595
Latin America & Caribbean 6,020 6,295 6,315 6,450 6,978 7,205
Middle East & North Africa 4,179 4,180 4,055 4,326 4,651 5,197
South Asia 1,132 1,268 1,505 1,745 2,110 2,530
Low & middle income 2,278 2,560 2,881 3,045 3,513 4,219
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.06 -1.60 -0.21 -1.64 0.79 1.79
East Asia & Pacific 5.26 6.12 5.76 9.10 5.63 7.06
Latin America & Caribbean 3.31 -0.95 -0.43 1.61 1.53 1.21
Middle East & North Africa -0.20 2.41 -1.20 1.18 1.91 2.78
South Asia 1.03 3.14 3.89 3.01 3.59 4.65
Low & middle income 2.79 1.99 1.93 1.56 3.23 4.58
Note: All Sub-Saharan African countries are included in claculations.




Figure 3 shows that Africa has the lowest CV of GDP per capita, which is due to 
its long economic stagnation. Figure 4 shows that African countries have the least 
predictable growth, as suggested by the largest CV. Numerous factors can explain this 
outcome, such as higher exposure to climatic shocks, changes in the international 
economic environment, political economy issues, and high incidence of conflicts. 
Guillaumont, Jeanneney and Brun (1999) found that, for Africa, these sources of 
instability contribute to the induction of bad policies that result in instabilities of the rate 
of investment and the real exchange rate and in lower total factor productivity.     7
Figure 3: GDP per capita  -  means, standard deviation and coefficient of 































Figure 4: GDP per capita growth  -  means, standard deviation and 


























Country-level growth patterns 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics at the country level. In general, African 
countries’ GDP per capita registered only modest increases between 1975 and 2005, and 
many countries--such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote D’Ivoire, and   8
Zimbabwe--and showed declining per capita incomes over the period. The SD of income 
per capita is generally low, and the CV of many countries is close to zero. Thus, the 
overall pattern of income growth in the region was both stagnant and stable.   
Consistent with the relative stability of income, growth rates for most countries 
were low. Despite some statistical commonalities, however, there were highly diverse 
growth experiences in Africa, and they can be described by the metaphor suggested by 
Pritchett (2000): hills, plateaus, mountains, and plains (see the illustrative examples in 
figure A.2 in the annex to this paper). The CV of growth in many countries is very high, 
suggesting that growth is highly erratic. Some noteworthy cases are the Comoros (–22.6), 
Ethiopia (18.4), Guinea-Bissau (–11.9), and South Africa (20.6), all of which are 
associated, at least in part, with some kind of internal or external conflict. More 
remarkable is that countries at different levels of income (like Botswana and Malawi) or 
following diverse long-term GDP per capita patterns (like Cape Verde, the Comoros, and 














Angola .. 2,169.5 1,973.7 242.3 0.123 1.66 13.50 -29.86 28.56 8.14
Benin 844.4 1,000.5 904.7 55.0 0.060 0.61 2.92 -6.88 6.47 4.80
Botswana 1,549.5 9,651.7 5,052.7 2,381.7 0.451 6.51 6.99 -4.62 18.27 1.07
Burkina Faso 781.7 1,092.9 927.1 83.2 0.086 1.17 3.26 -4.59 7.30 2.78
Burundi 691.0 584.2 728.9 95.1 0.132 -0.45 4.78 -8.88 9.17 -10.66
Cameroon 1,791.7 1,977.9 2,049.4 304.9 0.149 0.38 6.70 -11.32 26.19 17.42
Cape Verde .. 5,835.0 4,157.7 786.8 0.189 3.11 3.32 -1.44 12.71 1.07
Central African Republic 1,553.9 1,023.8 1,270.7 190.4 0.148 -1.28 4.46 -10.16 6.35 -3.47
Chad 997.2 1,616.4 937.5 199.4 0.216 2.15 10.60 -22.54 29.72 4.93
Comoros .. 1,795.2 1,882.5 115.8 0.062 -0.16 3.18 -7.87 4.59 -20.32
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2,269.0 678.6 1,388.9 572.3 0.410 -3.78 5.60 -21.00 5.01 -1.48
Congo, Rep. 665.3 931.5 893.6 158.7 0.173 1.83 12.74 -22.99 49.80 6.96
Cote d'Ivoire 2,333.5 1,400.8 1,891.5 394.8 0.209 -1.57 4.73 -15.26 7.60 -3.01
Equatorial Guinea .. .. 4,094.3 5,433.5 1.327 22.52 40.80 -5.65 156.86 1.81
Eritrea .. 907.1 965.2 120.3 0.125 2.20 9.21 -16.73 21.06 4.18
Ethiopia .. 896.4 782.5 72.1 0.092 0.43 7.78 -13.83 17.08 17.88
Gabon 8,546.4 5,839.4 6,732.9 1,192.6 0.175 -0.85 9.17 -22.89 30.20 -10.75
Gambia, The 1,601.6 1,780.6 1,696.2 88.2 0.052 0.53 5.94 -18.73 14.28 11.24
Ghana 1,818.4 2,148.9 1,711.4 196.5 0.116 0.63 3.75 -10.06 6.57 5.97
Guinea .. 2,040.0 1,894.3 99.2 0.052 0.62 1.97 -2.42 3.37 3.16
Guinea-Bissau 852.5 653.9 822.0 97.4 0.120 -0.49 8.59 -28.98 10.36 -17.71
Kenya 978.0 1,041.7 1,054.3 43.1 0.039 0.26 2.23 -4.11 4.91 8.58
Lesotho 720.6 2,472.2 1,447.6 591.8 0.399 4.51 8.43 -10.23 28.56 1.87
Madagascar 1,247.4 802.3 945.7 151.6 0.153 -1.36 4.49 -14.82 7.12 -3.30
Malawi 563.0 596.8 575.7 45.1 0.079 0.34 5.46 -9.40 14.83 16.19
Mali 736.6 930.3 764.9 86.9 0.115 0.87 5.80 -13.21 14.70 6.69
Mauritania 1,619.2 1,992.7 1,628.0 127.9 0.080 0.84 5.47 -13.22 11.74 6.52
Mauritius .. 11,141.2 7,335.3 2,249.9 0.307 4.10 1.51 1.30 6.91 0.37
Mozambique .. 1,219.9 751.6 195.5 0.260 2.56 7.58 -16.87 19.55 2.96
Namibia .. 6,979.6 6,377.0 718.9 0.113 -0.45 6.34 -12.21 13.51 -13.97
Niger 1,020.5 715.6 871.0 159.8 0.185 -1.03 5.47 -18.16 12.01 -5.34
Nigeria 921.9 1,057.9 870.7 95.4 0.111 0.65 6.18 -17.55 11.53 9.51
Rwanda 935.0 1,192.7 1,140.0 138.6 0.118 1.67 12.16 -47.14 36.31 7.27
Senegal 1,505.8 1,615.5 1,434.9 79.6 0.056 0.31 3.86 -5.45 12.23 12.64
Seychelles 7,354.6 14,865.8 12,428.0 3,227.5 0.250 2.65 7.66 -11.19 19.82 2.89
Sierra Leone 931.8 720.4 795.3 166.9 0.212 -0.52 8.19 -19.65 22.17 -15.62
South Africa 10,612.8 11,043.6 10,128.5 651.7 0.065 0.17 2.65 -4.57 5.46 15.89
Sudan 1,134.4 1,924.1 1,328.9 257.5 0.194 1.94 5.83 -9.26 12.70 3.01
Swaziland 3,470.5 4,595.3 3,805.8 587.8 0.156 1.11 6.11 -8.57 16.38 5.49
Tanzania .. 652.9 530.8 48.2 0.091 1.50 2.73 -2.61 5.04 1.81
Togo 1,783.6 1,410.9 1,594.8 199.1 0.125 -0.56 6.72 -16.70 15.74 -11.97
Uganda .. 1,363.4 1,034.4 192.8 0.186 1.91 3.17 -6.41 7.55 1.66
Zambia 1,361.9 930.0 1,011.9 197.4 0.190 -1.16 4.58 -12.11 8.61 -3.95
Zimbabwe 2,742.7 1,832.1 2,521.5 268.7 0.107 -1.17 5.85 -10.52 9.90 -5.01
Table 2: Countries' descriptive statistics  - 1975-2005
GDP per capita growth GDP per capita
 
Table 3 shows the decomposition of the SD of GDP per capita and its growth 
within and between countries. Variation of GDP per capita is mostly due to between-
country variations, whereas the variation in growth is basically due to within-country 
variation. In short, the GDP per capita of individual countries is relatively stable, and the 
bulk of the variation in Africa’s average income per person occurs between countries. 
Growth in contrast is highly unstable in individual countries. The bottom line is a high 
growth variation around a stable GDP per capita mean; the ratio of within-country SD to 
total SD of growth is 94 percent, although it is only 31 percent for GDP per capita. 
Variable Mean SD overall SD between countries SD within countries
GDP per capita 2,306 2,633 2,490 809
GDP per capita  growth 0.71 6.32 2.26 5.95
Notes: Statistics calculated from panel data.
Table 3: Decomposition of standard deviation of GDP per capita and growth - 1975-2005
   10
Figure 5 shows the comparative kernel density plot of GDP per capita. There has 
been slow economic growth as evidenced by the slight movement toward the right of the 
GDP per capita of 2005 compared with that of 1975 (figure 3a). The kernel plot identifies 
persistence and stratification, formation of convergence clubs, and the polarization of the 
distribution over time into twin peaks (Quah 1993a, 1993b) of relatively rich and poor 
African countries. 
The most significant shift toward polarization occurred between 1985 and 1995 
(figure 5c, a period when many countries were devastated by conflicts. Between 1995 
and 2005 (Figure 5d), we observe a substantial slide to the right, meaning increasing 
income throughout Africa. The second peak virtually disappears when we remove 
Botswana, Cape Verde, Gabon, Mauritius, Namibia, the Seychelles, and South Africa 
from the data. For that reason, they could be considered regional champions.
5   
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Figure 5d: 1995 vs. 2005
 
                                                 
5 In 2005, those countries hosted about 8.5 percent of the regional population, but produced 45 percent of 
the regional GDP.   11
The comparative kernel density of GDP per capita growth is depicted in figure 
3.6. It reveals that growth is becoming a more accurate predictor of economic 
performance and that growth is converging over time (see figure 6a). The SD dropped 
from 8.2 percent in 1976 to 3.6 percent in 2005. The decade 1976–85 marked the most 
significant change in growth distribution toward convergence (figure 6b). Since then, 
there has been an increasingly more acute peak around the mean (figures 6c and 6d). 
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Figure 6d: 1995 vs 2005
 
To examine further how the income distribution evolved over time, figure 7 
shows the CV of GDP per capita and the SD of growth.
6  From 1986 until 2002, the 
distribution of GDP per capita became increasingly more dispersed, but, since then, there 
has been some convergence. The distribution of growth, however, shows a negative long-
term trend toward convergence. 
The reduction of growth dispersion did not lead to overall convergence of income, 
however. The opposite slopes of curves in figure 5 indicate that the poorest countries 
                                                 
6 We present the SD of growth without extreme outliers. Among the observations removed from data are 
Angola (1992 and 1993), Chad (1993), and Rwanda (1992 and 1994). For example, Rwanda’s growth in 
1994 was –47 percent, and Angola’s growth was 27 percent in 1993.   12
were growing less, allowing the richest countries to maintain or even increase the income 
gap. Accordingly, the ratio of income of the richest 10 percent of countries to the poorest 
10 percent of countries was 10.5 in 1975, but it increased to 18.5 in 2005. In 1975–80, 
South Africa’s GDP per capita was 17 times higher than that of Malawi. In 2000–05, the 
gap between the then-highest GDP per capita--the Seychelles--and Malawi had grown to 
24 times. Africa is becoming an increasingly more unequal region in terms of its 
distribution of income among countries, despite the convergence of growth rates.
7 
Figure 7: Coefficient of variation of GDP per capita and standard 
deviation of growth
SD of growth 
(left scale)


















































































Another important aspect of long-term growth is whether it is persistent. Figure 8 
shows the regression of average GDP per capita growth as a function of growth in 1976. 
We ran the following cross-country model: 
ε β α + Δ + = Δ ) (
76
i i Y Y  
where  i Y Δ  is the average growth of country i, and 
76
i Y Δ is the growth rate of country i in 
1976, the first year in our series. The coefficient is positive and significant, (β = 0.013, t 
= 0.70).
8 So, there is no evidence of growth persistence. 
                                                 
7 We show below more evidence against the neoclassical hypothesis of income convergence. 
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Figure 8: GDP per capita as a function of initial conditions
 
We stratified the data before and after 1990 to assess whether there is persistence 
during the period when many economies experienced growth accelerations. We ran the 
following models: 
ε β α + Δ + = Δ
− ) (
76 90 76
i i Y Y  






90 76− Δ i Y  is the average GDP per capita growth between 1976 and 1990, 
05 91− Δ i Y  is 
the average GDP per capita growth between 1991 and 2005, and 
91
i Y Δ  is the growth rate 
of country i in 1991. 
The results are shown in figures 9a and 9b. Although the coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 7 percent level only in the first period ( 90 1976− β = 0.110, t = 1.89), it is 
significant in the second period ( 05 1991− β = 0.218, t = 3.64), thus suggesting that growth 
becomes somehow more predictable from the 1990s on--a finding that is in line with the 
kernel density exercises. The weak persistence is thus a phenomenon of the 1970s and 
1980s. 
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Figure 9b: 1991-2005
 
We also calculated the correlation coefficients of growth over time. Statistically 
significant (nonsignificant) coefficients suggest that country growth rates follow 
predictable (unpredictable) patterns. The results, presented in table 3.4, indicate that the 
large majority of coefficients is not statistically significant, including the vectors of 1991 
and 2005. This suggests that growth is erratic, even when, on average, it shows some 
persistence, as seems to be the case in the second period under analysis. Also, it confirms 
the finding in table 3.3 that most growth variation comes from within individual countries 
rather than across countries, as suggested in the decomposition of SD in table 3.3.
9  Even 
though there is some persistence in more recent years, the results imply that past growth 
does not help predict future growth and that the growth process in Africa may be erratic.   
                                                 
9 Easterly et al. (1993) found for a worldwide sample that correlation of growth across decades is also very 




1978 -0.32 0.44 1.00
1979 0.12 -0.01 0.27 1.00
1980 -0.18 -0.10 -0.13 0.18 1.00
1981 -0.07 -0.16 0.10 -0.07 0.10 1.00
1982 -0.07 -0.11 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.43 1.00
1983 0.20 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 0.16 0.26 0.29 1.00
1984 -0.08 0.00 0.17 -0.02 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.09 1.00
1985 -0.14 0.18 0.34 -0.22 -0.16 -0.03 0.09 0.10 -0.07 1.00
1986 -0.05 0.36 0.08 0.27 -0.01 -0.15 -0.19 -0.03 -0.18 -0.12 1.00
1987 -0.30 0.28 0.31 0.12 0.15 0.02 0.10 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.43 1.00
1988 0.34 0.02 -0.09 -0.15 0.09 -0.17 -0.03 0.22 0.04 0.45 -0.04 -0.01 1.00
1989 0.43 0.05 0.05 0.14 -0.01 -0.23 -0.15 0.19 0.23 -0.07 0.22 0.33 0.52 1.00
1990 0.19 -0.09 0.08 0.40 0.18 -0.20 -0.06 -0.12 0.22 0.12 -0.07 0.20 0.41 0.43 1.00
1991 0.44 0.01 0.04 -0.13 0.02 0.10 0.14 0.22 -0.03 0.25 -0.12 0.08 0.42 0.35 0.39 1.00
1992 0.43 0.14 0.16 0.12 -0.09 -0.08 0.00 0.32 -0.02 0.19 0.09 0.13 0.36 0.41 0.09 0.30 1.00
1993 0.28 -0.12 0.12 0.46 -0.02 -0.08 -0.03 -0.19 -0.03 -0.24 0.12 0.17 -0.08 0.17 0.48 0.38 0.09 1.00
1994 -0.25 0.10 -0.06 -0.34 -0.09 -0.10 -0.04 -0.20 0.20 0.15 0.00 0.09 0.27 0.27 0.10 0.03 -0.36 -0.25 1.00
1995 0.33 0.01 0.11 0.19 0.08 -0.06 0.02 0.11 -0.11 -0.09 0.03 -0.23 -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 0.14 0.44 0.17 -0.71 1.00
1996 0.15 -0.14 0.30 0.15 0.04 0.13 0.04 -0.11 -0.01 -0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.28 0.31 0.13 0.37 -0.14 0.40 1.00
1997 0.32 0.19 0.33 0.01 -0.12 -0.13 -0.10 0.00 0.16 0.29 0.06 -0.07 0.50 0.42 0.15 0.21 0.57 0.00 0.10 0.29 0.25 1.00
1998 0.10 0.28 -0.04 0.16 0.28 -0.28 0.05 0.26 -0.29 0.11 0.25 0.06 0.09 0.08 -0.13 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.02 -0.05 -0.40 0.04 1.00
1999 -0.01 0.27 0.29 0.12 -0.26 -0.04 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.49 0.35 0.09 0.23 -0.01 0.07 0.47 0.26 0.06 0.14 0.08 0.50 -0.06 1.00
2000 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.32 0.03 0.11 0.33 0.13 0.39 -0.15 -0.02 0.27 0.09 0.36 0.32 0.25 0.40 0.46 -0.07 -0.02 0.08 0.21 -0.07 0.45 1.00
2001 0.08 0.21 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.15 0.25 -0.07 -0.21 0.19 0.16 -0.04 0.13 -0.12 0.13 0.10 0.00 0.02 -0.20 -0.07 -0.31 0.22 -0.06 0.30 1.00
2002 0.04 0.22 0.10 -0.06 0.27 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.05 -0.09 0.03 0.22 -0.16 -0.09 -0.10 0.30 -0.13 -0.02 -0.16 0.04 0.09 -0.37 0.21 -0.38 0.05 0.54 1.00
2003 -0.04 0.26 -0.12 -0.18 -0.04 -0.33 -0.02 0.38 -0.07 -0.01 0.08 0.10 0.19 0.05 -0.15 0.04 0.18 -0.09 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.13 0.09 0.13 0.24 0.49 0.21 1.00
2004 -0.07 0.17 -0.09 -0.61 -0.11 -0.10 0.14 0.54 0.08 0.41 -0.26 0.02 0.32 -0.03 -0.24 0.20 0.22 -0.39 0.05 -0.01 -0.15 -0.06 0.12 -0.04 0.00 0.30 0.27 0.64 1.00
2005 0.03 0.11 -0.10 0.00 0.15 -0.05 0.27 0.19 0.00 -0.36 0.07 0.22 0.02 0.04 -0.26 -0.05 0.22 0.01 -0.26 0.18 -0.05 -0.21 0.03 0.14 0.47 0.46 0.35 0.64 0.37 1.00
Note: coefficients in italics are statistically significant at the 5% level.
n=44.
Table 4: Correlation coefficient of GDP per capita growth
 
 GDP per capita convergence 
We examined further whether the income per capita of the poorest African 
countries tends to converge toward the regions’ richest ones. For convergence to occur, 
poor countries have to grow faster (Barro 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991). We ran 
the following unconditional regression: 
ε β α + + = Δ
75
i Y Yi  
where  i Y Δ  is the average growth rate of country i, and 
75
i Y  is the GDP per capita of 
country i in 1975. 
The regression in figure 10 shows no support for the overall convergence 
hypothesis, which may result from the high income heterogeneity between African 
countries and from stratification of data in clubs, as suggested by figure 5. Although the 
estimated coefficient is negative as expected, it is not significant (β = –0.122, t = –
0.29).
10 McCoskey (2002) examined whether there is income convergence in Africa, 
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Figure 10: Average growth as a function of initial conditions
 
We also split the sample into before 1990 and after 1990 to assess convergence in 
the second period when growth accelerated, and we ran the following models: 
ε β α + + = Δ
− ) (
75 90 76
i i Y Y  




i   
                                                 
10 The statistical and qualitative results remain the same when we remove outliers such as Botswana and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo from the regression.   17
The estimated coefficients of both periods are not significant, thus suggesting no 
convergence at all. 
Cross-Country Structure of GDP Per Capita 
We now assess in more detail the structure of income per capita. A stable 
structure implies little income mobility, which, in turn, suggests that policies, external 
shocks, conflicts, and other factors may not substantially change the distribution of GDP 
per capita across countries in the long run. 
We run the following regression: 




where  i Y  is the mean GDP per capita of country i, and 
75
i Y is the GDP per capita of 
country i in 1975. The result described in figure 11 shows a line near 45 degrees (β = 
0.901, t = 7.41) and suggests that, apart from a few cases, the average GDP per capita 
closely mirrors that of 1975--thus reflecting inertia, stratification, and the importance of 
initial conditions in economic output. Nevertheless, there are some outliers, such as 
Botswana and Namibia, whose average GDPs per capita are well above the 1975 levels, 
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Figure 11: Mean GDPpc as a function of GDPpc in 1975
 
We calculated the correlation coefficients of GDP per capita over time. 
Statistically significant coefficients suggest that the GDP per capita hardly changed and 
                                                 
11 We also ran the same model while controlling for growth SD, and the results were virtually the same.   18
its structure remained relatively stable. Table 5 shows that most coefficients are large, 
thus supporting the evidence of inertia and stable structure. Year 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1975 1.00
1976 0.99 1.00
1977 1.00 1.00 1.00
1978 0.97 0.96 0.98 1.00
1979 0.96 0.95 0.97 1.00 1.00
1980 0.97 0.95 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00
1981 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
1982 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
1983 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
1984 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
1985 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00
1986 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00
1987 0.89 0.87 0.90 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.99 1.00
1988 0.88 0.87 0.89 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
1989 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
1990 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
1991 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
1992 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
1993 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
1994 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1995 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1996 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.92 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1997 0.82 0.82 0.84 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1998 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.90 0.92 0.91 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1999 0.78 0.78 0.80 0.88 0.91 0.90 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
2000 0.76 0.77 0.79 0.87 0.90 0.88 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
2001 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2002 0.75 0.76 0.78 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2003 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
2004 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
2005 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.93 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
Note: all coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level.
n=44.
Table 5: Correlation coefficient of GDP per capita
 
 To assess further the GDP per capita structure, we calculated the ratio of 43 
countries’ GDP per capita to that of South Africa, the largest African economy, for 1975 
and 2005. Table 6 shows that 19 countries experienced a relative improvement in their 
GDP per capita of 2 percent or more in relation to South Africa; 13 experienced slight or 
no change at all; and 11 experienced steep  deterioration. These figures suggest little 
income mobility among African countries. The modest changes observed in relation to 
South Africa may be surprising in view of the long period of stagnation it endured until 
the late 1990s. Notable exceptions are Botswana, Cape Verde, and Equatorial Guinea--all 
mineral exporters that strongly improved GDP per capita. It is interesting to note that 
resource-rich oil exporters do not always improve their relative positions (Angola, Chad, 
and Nigeria). This finding suggests that mineral resources may help but do not determine 








2005 (or most 
recent year)
Angola 0.19 0.21 Lesotho 0.12 0.30
Benin 0.09 0.10 Madagascar 0.13 0.08
Botswana 0.19 1.12 Malawi 0.06 0.06
Burkina Faso 0.08 0.11 Mali 0.08 0.09
Burundi 0.08 0.06 Mauritania 0.20 0.20
Cameroon 0.18 0.21 Mauritius 0.40 1.14
Cape Verde 0.23 0.52 Mozambique 0.07 0.11
Central African Republic 0.17 0.11 Namibia 0.65 0.68
Chad 0.10 0.13 Niger 0.10 0.07
Comoros 0.19 0.18 Nigeria 0.10 0.10
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.23 0.06 Rwanda 0.09 0.11
Congo, Rep. 0.10 0.11 Senegal 0.15 0.16
Cote d'Ivoire 0.25 0.15 Seychelles 0.76 1.45
Equatorial Guinea 0.13 0.73 Sierra Leone 0.10 0.07
Eritrea 0.09 0.10 Sudan 0.12 0.19
Ethiopia 0.09 0.09 Swaziland 0.32 0.43
Gabon 0.97 0.63 Tanzania 0.05 0.07
Gambia, The 0.16 0.17 Togo 0.18 0.14
Ghana 0.20 0.22 Uganda 0.08 0.13
Guinea 0.19 0.21 Zambia 0.14 0.09
Guinea-Bissau 0.11 0.07 Zimbabwe 0.29 0.18
Kenya 0.10 0.11
Note: Ratio is a fraction of GDP per capita in South Africa.
Table 6: GDP per capita disparities
 
The limited income mobility over time suggests that African countries experience 
similar economic cycles, despite conflicts and other factors observed on the continent that 
could have affected productivity and changed the positions in the GDP per capita 
ranking. This empirical evidence suggests contagion, interdependence, regional   21
spillovers, and externalities among African countries.
12  Recorded and unrecorded trade, 
regional migration, remittances, and regional conflicts are among the potential channels 
through which countries affect others, eventually keeping productivity and GDP per 
capita relatively unchanged over time. 
4. Checking for Common Country Features 
The previous sections have identified some stylized facts about the long-term 
GDP per capita growth that cut across African countries. Despite sharing common 
attributes, however, African economies are quite diverse and their diversity is increasing. 
In this section, we examine if countries indeed follow common GDP per capita patterns 
and if there is a country typology based on economic outcomes. 
Country groups 
We split the time-series into two subperiods, 1975–90 and 1991–2005. Such 
periods are long enough to allow for the data to capture macroeconomic cycles and to get 
rid of short-run noises. For each year, we calculated the median of the African continent’s 
GDP per capita, which served as a benchmark, and then checked for every year if each 
country’s GDP per capita is above or below the benchmark. A country whose GDP per 
capita remained above the median for most years of 1975–90 was assigned category “A,” 
meaning that its GDP per capita was generally “above” Africa’s benchmark. A country 
whose GDP per capita remained below the median for most years was assigned category 
“B,” meaning “below” Africa’s benchmark.
13 The same exercise is applied for the second 
period, 1991–2005. It is also possible that a country switches categories, and we account 
for that by having four possible combinations.
14 In short, the combinations are 
• AA--Countries whose GDP per capita is above Africa’s median GDP per capita 
for most years of the first and second periods 
                                                 
12 Internal conflicts in Africa often spill out into wider regions--for example, Sudan–Chad, Liberia–Sierra 
Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo and several neighbors. 
13 Bosworth and Collins (2003) had a similar method for grouping countries. They grouped 84 countries 
from all regions as higher income and lower income, according to the per capita income above or below the 
median. However, they took the income per capita in 1960, their first year, as reference for grouping. 
Garner (2006) used average long-term growth rates to classify African countries. We also tested other 
criteria for grouping countries, using means instead of medians, growth instead of GDP per capita level, 
and clustering analysis, among others; but the present exercise provided the most robust results. We ran the 
median exercise removing South Africa, but the classification of countries remained basically the same. 
14 Table A.4 in the annex shows the countries’ GDP per capita and median by year and respective 
assignments to country groups.   22
• BB--Countries whose GDP per capita is below Africa’s median GDP per capita 
for most years of the first and second periods 
• BA--Countries whose GDP per capita switches from below to above Africa’s 
median GDP per capita from the first to the second period 
• AB--Countries whose GDP per capita switches from above to below Africa’s 
median GDP per capita from the first to the second period. 
The results of this exercise are presented in table 7. AA countries have a 
substantially larger average GDP per capita, $3,648, which is more than four times higher 
than that of BB countries; and AAs have higher mean growth, 1.05 percent than BBs, 
0.37 percent. T-statistics do not reject the hypothesis of equality of growth means of AA 
and BB, but they do reject the equality of means of GDP per capita. When we split the 
series by period, we observe that AA countries grew substantially more than BBs in the 
first period, but BB countries undertook an impressive growth acceleration in the second 
period (from –0.07 percent to 0.81 percent), closing the gap with AAs. Table 7 also 
shows that countries at different levels of income experience high growth volatility, 
which confirms that volatility is a distinctive phenomenon of African economies.   
In the first period, AA countries had a 64 percent share of regional GDP. That 
share fell slightly to 63 percent in the second period. BBs increased from 28 percent to 32 
percent. This relative stability may be surprising in view of the economic and political 
ups and downs experienced by these countries over time. The AAs’ share of the African 
continent’s population was only about 31 percent, whereas BB countries hosted about 56 
percent of the population.   
BA countries comprise Equatorial Guinea and Sudan, both oil exporters. These 
economies grew by 4 percent a year, but the expansion was confined to the second period 
when the annual growth was 9.0 percent (from –0.7 percent in the first period). That 
enabled their GDP per capita to increase by 60 percent between 1975 and 2005. 
The AB economies collapsed mainly as a result of conflicts, but the economic 
disintegration intensified in the second period when the annual growth rate was –3 
percent. That disintegration led the average GDP per capita to shrink from $1,930 in 1975   23
to only $862 in 2005. It is more striking that in 1975 these economies were responsible 
for 4.3 percent of the region’s GDP, but in 2005 their share had fallen to a mere 1.4 
percent. The BAs’ income rise along with the plunge of the ABs help explain the 
increasing dispersion of income per capita as identified in figure 5.     24
Country-
group





1975 2005 1975-05 1976-90 1991-05 1976-05 1976-05 1976-05 1975-80 2000-05 1975 2005
AA Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, and 
Zimbabwe
20 3,424 4,241 3,648 1.07 1.02 1.05 1.44 1.37 64.3 62.6 31.7 31.1
BB Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, 
Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zambia.
20 931 933 880 -0.07 0.81 0.37 1.73 4.67 28.3 32.1 56.2 56.7
BA Equatorial Guinea and Sudan
2 1,161 1,853 1,787 -0.71 8.84 4.06 9.16 2.25 3.1 4.0 4.8 4.5
AB Central African Republic and Democratic 
Republic of Congo 2 1,930 862 1,301 -2.18 -3.04 -2.61 3.46 -1.32 4.3 1.4 7.3 7.6
Notes: t-test does not reject the hypothesis of equality of means of growth rates (1976-2005) between AA and BB, but reject the equality of means of GDP per capita.
Average GDP per capita Share of Africa's 
population (%)
Table 7: Country groups - basic statistics
Average growth Share of Africa's GDP 
(%)
 
   25
Figure 12 shows the GDP per capita by country group over time. AA countries 
have the highest GDP per capita, as expected, and the gap separating them from other 
countries has increased more recently. BAs’ GDP per capita increased in the second 
period; the ABs collapsed; and the BBs remained flat all the way, only showing some 
modest improvement in the more recent past. Because AB and BA groups accounted for 
less than 6 percent of the region’s GDP in the 2000s, and for about 12 percent of the 
population, it is reasonable to think that AA and BB countries alone guide the regional 
economy. 
The CV of GDP per capita of AA countries increased from 0.027 in 1975–90 to 
0.073 in 1991–2005; the BBs remained almost unchanged, increasing only from 0.038 to 
0.041. Thus, the increasing income inequality identified in figure 7 is mainly driven by 
the large and rising income dispersion among AA countries. 
We examined whether there is income convergence within country groups. For 
each group, we ran unconditional growth regressions against GDP per capita in 1975. 
The results showed no convergence between AA countries nor between the more 
homogeneous BB countries. 
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Figure 13 shows a more detailed examination of the share of country groups in the 
regional GDP. Apart from some swap in ranking between AB and BA groups, there is no 
significant change over time. This accords with the previous finding that initial 
conditions matter. 













Table 8 sorts countries by country groups, long-term growth performance, mineral 
resources, and geography--the last two variables increasingly being identified in the 
literature as predictors of economic performance in Africa (Collier and O’Connell 2004). 
No pattern emerges, however. Within AA and BB country groups, there are oil-rich and 
non-mineral-intensive countries, landlocked and coastal countries, and both growing and 
shrinking economies. Table 8 also shows landlocked, non-resource-intensive countries 
growing at high rates (such as Burkina Faso, Rwanda, and Uganda) and shrinking oil 
exporters (such as Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon). These highly diverse experiences suggest 
that initial conditions and institutions may be more important than geographic attributes 
in explaining Africa’s long-term GDP per capita.
15 
                                                 
15 The literature has suggested that mineral-dependent countries grow more slowly not only as a result of 
Dutch disease, but also because of civil strife and corruption associated with the rents engendered from 
those resources (Collier 2007; Sachs and Warner 1995). The diverse picture presented here opposes that 
view. Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) suggested that geography 
affects income only indirectly through institutions.   27
The feature that most distinguishes AA from BB countries is certainly not growth 
rates; rather, it is the AAs’ much larger capability to create income and wealth. Shrinking 
AA economies, such as Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Zimbabwe, have GDP per capita far 
above such BB growers as Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda (the GDPs per capita of 
the first three countries are $1,811, $7,041, and $2,526, respectively; those of the latter 
three countries are $704, $529, and $976, respectively). As a consequence, the AAs have 
more means to fight poverty and foster development if the right policies are in place. One 
cannot sort countries into a distinct pattern of winners and losers, however, based only on 
country groups. Actually, growing countries, whatever their groups, are those that are 
more likely to reshape the continent’s economy in the long run. 
Country-
group
Shrinking economies (avrg. growth 
below 0)
Stagnant (avrg. growth between 0 
and 0.71%)
Growers (avrg. growth above 
0.71%)
$ Comoros (-0.14) # Angola (0.70) & Botswana (6.24)
# Cote d'Ivoire (-1.57) $ Gambia (0.29) $ Cape Verde (3.26)
# Gabon (-0.91) $ Ghana (0.60) # Cameroon (0.81)
$ Togo (-0.60) & Guinea (0.62) % Lesotho (3.27)
% Zimbabwe (-1.26) $ Mauritania (0.10) $ Mauritius (4.22)
$ Senegal (0.36) & Namibia (1.15)
$ South Africa (0.12) $ Seychelles (2.47)
% Swaziland (1.15)
% Burundi (-0.46) $ Benin (0.60) % Burkina Faso (1.21)
$ Guine Bissau (-0.70) # Congo (0.61) # Chad (1.34)
$ Madagascar (-1.38) % Ethiopia (0.42) $ Erithrea (1.96)
% Niger (-1.00) $ Kenya (0.48) % Mali (0.86)
& Sierra Leone (-0.57) % Malawi (0.22) $ Mozambique (2.07)
& Zambia (-1.16) # Nigeria (0.28) % Rwanda (1.68)
$ Tanzania (1.69)
% Uganda (1.92)
# Equatorial Guinea (10.55)
# Sudan (1.72)
% Central African Rep. (-1.27)
% DRC (-3.95)
Notes: 0.71% is the average growth rate in 1975-2005.
Average growth rate in parentheses.
# Oil exporter.
& Non-oil resource intensive.
$ Non-resource intensive, coastal country.
% Non-resource intensive, landlocked country.






The Role of Initial Conditions at the Country-Group Level 
To assess whether initial conditions play a role at the country-group level as well, 
we ran regressions of average GDP per capita on initial conditions and SD of growth, and 
the same model with average growth as the dependent variable. We estimated 
coefficients for AA and BB countries separately. The models are the following: 
ε λ β α + Δ + + = ) (
75
i i i Y SD Y Y    28
ε λ β α + Δ + + = Δ ) (
75
i i i Y SD Y Y  
The results for GDP per capita suggest an almost perfect inertia for AA countries, 
as the estimated and statistically significant coefficient is 0.93. A hypothetical increase of 
$1 in the 1975 GDP per capita therefore would be almost entirely transmitted to the mean 
GDP per capita (see table 9). The estimated coefficient for BB economies is 0.15, but it is 
not statistically significant. These results suggest that initial conditions seem to play a 
larger role in explaining the economic performance of the better-off countries. 
In the growth models, initial conditions are not statistically significant for both 
groups. This finding suggests no income convergence within and between groups, as 
already pointed out. 
Data GDP per capita in 1975 Standard deviation of growth R
2 N
AA & BB countries 1.00 (9.24) -144.8 (-1.52) .70 39
AA countries .923 (4.83) -181.7 (-.69) .63 18
BB countries .147 (1.35) 9.32 (.61) .16 18
Data GDP per capita in 1975 Standard deviation of growth R
2 N
AA & BB countries -.000 (-.27) -.012 (-.10) .00 39
AA countries -.000 (-.28) -.165 (-.63) .04 18
BB countries .000 (.47) .100 (.96) .09 18
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses.
Table 9: Impact of initial conditions on GDP per capita
Dependent variable: GDP per capita
Dependent variable: Growth
 
Robustness of Country Groups 
This section examines the robustness of country groups by testing their statistical 
significance. We estimated coefficients of country groups in GDP per capita pooled and 
fixed-effect regression models, as follows: 
it t t it g i it t t C G Y ε η λ φ β α + + + + + =
2  
it t t it g i it t t C G Y ε η λ φ β α + + + + + = Δ
2  
where  it Y  is the GDP per capita of country i in year t,  i α  is the country fixed-effect,  it Y Δ  
is the growth rate of country i in year t,  g G  is the dummy of country-group g,  i C  is the 
dummy of country i,  t t  is time, 
2
t t  is time squared, and ε  is the error term. 
Table 10 shows the results. Country groups’ coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level; they are sizable and have the expected signs. After 
controlling for country fixed-effects, country groups, and time and its quadratic term,   29
model 2 explains 94 percent of the GDP per capita dispersion. If one moves residence 
from a BB country, the base group, to an AA country, she or he would enjoy a 193 
percent income rise, on average. A person moving to a BA country could expect income 
improvement of 88 percent, and someone moving to an AB economy could expect 91 
percent improvement. Wald tests strongly reject the notion that country groups’ 
coefficients are zero or equal. 
Model 4 presents the impacts of country groups on growth, after controlling for 
country fixed-effects. Only the coefficient of AAs is not significant, suggesting that they 
tend to grow at the same pace as BBs. As expected, Wald test rejects the hypothesis that 
groups’ coefficients are all zero or equal. These results suggest that country groups are 
relevant in predicting income and growth. 
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
AA 1.237 (41.1) 1.929 (31.12) .603 (1.63) -.612 (-.30)
BA .619 (8.29) .879 (14.76) 4.761 (5.17) 9.107 (4.53)
AB .362 (5.31) .914 (15.35) -2.979 (-3.55) -5.49 (-2.98)
R2 .57 .94 .05 .13
F test 342 (.00) 402 (.00) 13.09 (.00) 3.81 (.00)
N 1,268 1,268 1,224 1,224
Country dummies included no yes no yes
Wald test that groups' 
coefficients are equal 108.01 [.00] 253.9 [.00] 21.21 [.00] 34.06 [.00]
Wald test that groups' 
coefficients are zero 569.7 [.00] 333.8 [.00] 15.05 [.00] 22.71 [.00]
Notes: t-test in parentheses.
p-value in brackets.
Time and time square included in all models.
Table 10: Impact of country groups on GDP per capita level and growth - pooled OLS regressions
Dep. variable: GDP per capita growth Dep. variable: GDP per capita
 
If country groups indeed capture common country features, they need to fit not 
only income and growth data, but also other relevant economic and social variables. To 
assess this hypothesis, we ran models similar to the ones above, but with other dependent 
variables. Table 11 shows that most country-group dummy coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level and have the expected signs. Model 1, for example, 
shows that agriculture value added as a share of GDP in AA countries is, on average, 
about 17 percent below that of BB countries, the base group; and that, as a share of GDP 
in AB countries, it is 5 percent higher. Accordingly, BB countries are more heavily 
dependent on agriculture. Country groups plus time and time squared can explain about 
33 percent of the variance of agriculture value added. 
Model 2 shows that AA and BA countries have a greater share of industry in GDP 
than do BB countries. Model 3 shows that AA countries have a larger service sector.   30
Model 4 shows that AA and BA economies are substantially more open than are BB 
economies. Considering the dynamic and static benefits of openness to growth, as 
suggested by the new growth literature (Grossman and Helpman 1991a, 1991b), it may 
help explain the poorer economic performance of BB economies.   
Models 5 and 6 indicate that AA countries invest and save more than BBs do. 
Although the AAs’ coefficient of fixed capital is perhaps modest, the productivity of 
investment, as suggested by Devarajan, Easterly, and Pack (2003), also may be important 
to explain the better economic outcomes of these countries. Models 7 to 10 show that AA 
countries have a better external balance, lower debt ratios, lower dependency ratio, and a 
significantly longer life expectancy. Perhaps it is surprising that model 11 shows that AA 
countries enjoy more aid per capita than do BBs. 
These results are in harmony with the better economic and human development 
indicators of AA countries, as compared with BBs. They also suggest that there seem to 
be “two Africas,” roughly represented by AA and BB country groups. 














Aid per capita 
($)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
AA -16.80 8.17 8.60 39.73 4.94 6.17 2.71 -27.36 -.07 7.92 34.88
BA 2.06 6.17 -8.23 18.50 9.15 3.28 -4.28 22.47 -.10 2.58 11.53
AB 5.11 .94 -6.05 -6.63 -7.06 -.45 3.30 -3.45 -.03 -1.29 -7.63
R
2 .33 .09 .18 .26 .11 .03 .03 .20 .19 .26 .14
F test 122.06 27.3 56.16 89.66 30.86 8.70 7.51 60.80 64.97 40.51 42.54
N 1,252 1,252 1,252 1,239 1,227 1,227 1,025 1,167 1,328 567 1,270
Wald test that 
groups' coefficients 
are equal 116.4 9.10 89.57 54.90 46.04 4.37 8.52 15.16 9.61 26.18 22.21
Wald test that 
groups' coefficients 
are zero 195.8 40.48 93.24 142.60 48.86 13.33 9.87 19.80 79.80 61.72 48.25
Note: Time and time square included in all models.
Dependent variable presented above each model #.
BB is the base country-group.
Dependent variables of models 1 to 8 are measured as percentage share of GDP.
Coefficients in italics significant at the 5% level.
Table 11: Selected economic and human development variables as function of country-groups - pooled OLS regression
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Figure 14 illustrates the previous econometric results. Dependency ratios of AA 
and BB countries were somewhat comparable until the early 1980s, but then the ratio 
started to fall sharply in AA countries and continued to climb in BB countries, thus 
enlarging the gap between the two groups. The gaps are also big for life expectancy and 
under-5 mortality. In the 1960s, aid per capita was comparable for various groups, but the 
gap started to widen toward the end of the decade. In 1990, AA countries received, on 
average, almost three times more aid than did BB countries ($112 and $41, respectively). 
The gap has since narrowed, mainly as a result of a reduction in the aid received by AA 
countries.   
Figure 14: Selected variables by country-group 
 
Finally, we estimated multinomial logit regressions of country clubs against each 
of these variables at a time: GDP per capita, growth, savings, capital, trade, agriculture 
value added, life expectancy, and other independent variables. The estimated model is as 
follows: 
ε β α + + = =
t
i i X X j G ob ) | ( Pr  
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where ) | ( Pr X j G ob i =  is the probability of country-group dummy  i G  taking value j 
given 
t
i X ; the independent variables for country-group i and time t,  and j are country-
groups AA, BB, BA, and AB.
16 
The model with GDP per capita as independent variable returns the following 
coefficients: AA=13.67 (z=15.78), BA=10.89 (z=11.95), and AB=6.81 (z=9.20).  The 
model for growth as explanatory variable provides these coefficients: AA=0.02 (z=1.69), 
BA=0.09 (z=4.48), and AB=-0.07 (z=-3.58). In regard to life expectancy, for example, 
the coefficients are AA=7.99 (z=9.99), BA=3.14 (z=2.06), and AB=-1.34 (z=-0.88). 
These and the non-reported results have the expected signs and hierarchy, and confirm 
the robustness of country-groups to predict income and human development outcomes. 
5. Growth Volatility 
  High growth volatility is one of the most distinctive features of African 
economies. In this section, we examine its relationship to economic performance and a 
number of factors that are correlated with it. 
Growth Volatility and Economic Performance 
The defining characteristics of the long-run pattern of growth described above are 
low output growth and high volatility. The literature long has attempted to explain the 
poor economic performance in Africa in the postwar period. Barro (1991), Levine and 
Renelt (1992), and Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004), among others, found a 
structural low-growth effect in Africa that remained even after controlling for investment, 
fertility, education, macroeconomic policies, and other conventional variables. Growth 
accounting exercises show that growth in physical capital per worker in Africa has been 
less than 0.5 percent a year since 1960, far slower than the world average of 1.0 percent. 
Capital deepening was negative between 1990 and 2003, suggesting low capital 
investment in the region (Bosworth and Collins 2003). The contribution of human capital 
to growth kept pace with the rest of the world and has increased lately, mainly as a result 
of rising average years of schooling. But the main contributor to Africa’s disappointing 
growth is total factor productivity change, negative since the 1960s and –0.4 percent 
between 1990 and 2003.   
                                                 
16 BB is the base category. For the sake of space, we report only a few results. The complete set of results is 
available from the authors upon request.   34
History and initial conditions are also found to play an important role in Africa’s 
fate. According to Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2003), for example, countries that 
inherited institutions that supported rent-extracting activities from their colonial past were 
most likely to experience high volatility and economic crisis. Once they control for these 
institutions, the “Africa-dummy” tends to lose significance in cross-country growth 
models. Those authors concluded that poor economic policies are a result--not the cause--
of poor economic outcomes. O’Connell (2004) suggested that political polarization at the 
time of independence is strongly associated with conflicts.   
The literature on economic volatility in developing countries is large and focuses 
mainly on macroeconomic and financial sector issues. The standard macroeconomic view 
links volatility to bad macroeconomic policies. Accordingly, high inflation, misaligned 
exchange rates, large government sectors, and budget deficits will result in economic 
crisis. More recently, there has been increased focus on institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson 2003). 
Given the magnitude of growth volatility in Africa, we examined whether it is 
associated with poor economic performance. Theoretically, this relationship can be 
positive or negative, depending on the mechanisms driving the relationship (Imbs 2002). 
But Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Hnatkovska and Loayza (2004) found empirical 
evidence of a negative relationship between the SD of growth and macroeconomic 
volatility for large cross-country data sets. Hnatkovska and Loayza also showed that this 
effect is particularly evident for institutionally underdeveloped countries undergoing 
intermediate stages of financial development or unable to conduct countercyclical fiscal 
policies. Thus, we also expected to find a negative and statistically significant 
relationship. 
We estimate the following bivariate, unconditional regressions: 
ε β α + Δ + = Δ ) ( i i Y SD Y  
ε β α + Δ + = ) ( i i Y SD Y  
where  i Y Δ  is the average growth rate of country i,  i Y  is the average GDP per capita of 
country i, ) ( i Y SD Δ  is the SD of growth of country i, and ε  is the error term.   35
The results in figure 15 suggest a negative but statistically not significant 
association between volatility and growth (β = –0.075, t = –0.68, figure 3.15a) and 
between volatility and GDP per capita (β = –0.023, t = –0.61, figure 15b).
17  
One explanation for the lack of relationship is that it may require a conditional 
model using policy and structural country characteristics as controls. An alternative 
explanation for the lack of a direct, long-run relationship is that African economies are 
already in their steady-state equilibrium pattern and short-term volatility is not able to 
divert them significantly from their long-term track. This hypothesis is consistent with 
the poverty trap argument. Another potential explanation is the inherent endogeneity of 
these variables (Easterly and Levine 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004; and 
others). Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2003), for example, argued that high growth 
volatility and poor macroeconomic performance are both symptoms--and therefore not 
independent--of institutionally weak societies, in which distortionary macroeconomic 
policies are tools that groups in power deploy to reap rents and remain in power. This, in 
turn, leads the economies to further difficulties in dealing with political and economic 
shocks (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001) and makes economic adjustments in face of 
external shocks more difficult (Rodrik 1999), all leading to more political and economic 
instability. 
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Growth Volatility and Its Correlates 
Although it does not seem to affect long-term economic performance 
significantly, volatility certainly must have short-term welfare effects via uncertainty, 
                                                 
17 We ran regressions removing the middle income countries from the data (Mauritius, the Seychelles, and 
South Africa), but the results were virtually unchanged.   36
risks, and other channels on investments, savings, and credit, for example. In this section, 
we are interested in identifying variables other than institutions most likely to be 
associated with long-term growth variance in Africa.
18  We ran cross-country bivariate 
and multivariate models of the SD of GDP per capita growth as a function of selected 
economic variables as follows: 
ε β α + + = Δ i i X Y SD ) ( 
where  ) ( i Y SD Δ  is the average SD of growth of country i, and  i X  is a vector of variables 
of country i. For brevity, only statistically significant variables at 5 percent and 10 
percent are reported and discussed here. The results are presented in table 12.
19 
Models 1 and 2 show that a 1.0 percent change in the SD of savings and capital 
formation is associated with a 0.4 percent change in growth volatility. These results are 
expected for poor countries where investments are highly volatile because they rely on 
residents and nonresidents who usually bring in capital during an export bonanza but pull 
out as soon as crises appear or terms of trade change. Public investments are usually 
sensitive to foreign aid flow and political cycles, which are volatile variables, too. 
Model 3 shows that the rise of one point in the diversification of exports index is 
associated with a reduction of 0.3 percent in growth volatility. This result is in line with 
the stylized fact that less-diversified economies are poorly protected from fluctuations in 
market conditions. Economies highly dependent on few products or a single product are 
vulnerable to external shocks and may suffer from the Dutch disease, which discourages 
domestic industry via an overvalued exchange rate. Table A.2 in the annex shows that 
export diversification in Africa is generally low, especially in oil-rich countries such as 
Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and 
                                                 
18 As reviewed above, institutions are found to be a primary source of growth volatility in developing 
countries (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2003; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004; and others). 
As discussed in the methodology section, there is certainly enormous potential for endogeneity between 
growth volatility and the correlates under examination. But our primary interest is in identifying long-term 
associations, not in explaining growth volatility. 
19 We also tested other variables, including aid as a percentage of gross national income, terms of trade, 
exchange rate, inflation, initial conditions (GDP per capita in 1975), agriculture value added as a 
percentage of GDP (a variable that seeks to capture the impact of climate shocks on agriculture), 
population, and dependency ratio. All were nonsignificant at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels. Credit to 
the private sector as a percentage of GDP was statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Acemoglu and 
Zilibotti (1997) showed a strong relationship between initial income and volatility. They interpreted that as 
resulting from the fact that richer countries are able to achieve a more balanced sectoral distribution of 
output.   37
Sudan. The average diversification index in the region is 4.8 (the index goes from 0 to 
100.0), which suggests that export revenues strongly rely on few tradable items. 
Model 4 shows that a 1.0 percent change in the SD of openness is associated with 
a 0.2 percent change in growth volatility. Where foreign trade exerts an important 
influence in aggregate demand, volatility of openness may play a role in growth 
volatility. Because export revenues in poor countries usually are crucial to pay for 
imports of capital goods and raw material, to service foreign debt, and to use as collateral 
in foreign financial markets, adverse changes in trade may have significant implications 
for growth. Volatility of openness may result from internal factors, such as regulatory and 
trade policies; from external factors that also affect the exchange rate, terms of trade, and 
foreign demand; and from conflicts and natural disasters, like draughts and insect attacks 
in agriculture-intensive countries. 
The weighted average openness ratio in Africa is 46 percent, whereas it is 37 
percent and 35 percent, respectively, in low- and middle-income countries and in the 
world. (Table A.3 in the annex shows a proxy of openness--the merchandise trade as a 
share of GDP and its SD). Africa is more open but also more exposed to adverse trade 
shocks via a high SD of openness and low diversification of exports. In Ghana, for 
example, the SD of openness is 17 percent. Given that the average openness is 55 
percent, it has varied in the range of 38 percent to 72 percent of GDP over time, which 
should have non-negligible effects on the Ghanaian growth volatility.
20 
Model 5 suggests that a 1.0 percent rise in volatility of aid per capita is associated 
with an increase of 0.2 percent in growth volatility. This result stresses the importance 
and impact that aid has on the economy. Among the main channels through which aid has 
such an effect are certainly the government budget--which has increased over time--and 
investments in areas such as utilities and infrastructure. 
Model 6 suggests that an additional year in life expectancy is associated with a 
reduction of 0.17 percent in growth volatility. Low probability of survival affects 
                                                 
20 Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (2006) found evidence in a large set of countries that more liberal trade 
regimes and competitive exchange rates are associated with longer spells of growth and less growth 
volatility. Johnson, Ostry, and Subramanian (2007) found that a strong exporting sector, especially in 
manufacturing, is strongly associated with longer growth spells. They argued that manufacturing exports 
help change the distribution of power and help create a middle class that favors the strengthening of 
institutions.   38
consumption and savings decisions. The lower the probability of survival, the lower will 
be the benefits of long-term investment, including formal education, because the returns 
to human capital accrue mainly over adult life. A shortened expected life span reduces 
incentives for capital accumulation and affects growth via lower levels of human and 
physical capital investments. Ndulu (2006) found that life expectancy is among the most 
influential variables associated with growth in Africa, and that it helps explain the growth 
gap between Africa and other developing regions. Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg 
(2006) found that a high adult mortality rate explains almost all of Africa’s slow growth. 
Model 7 presents a model with all the previous variables. The SDs of savings and 
life expectancy remained statistically significant, thus suggesting they are among the 
most influential variables associated with growth volatility. 
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
SD of savings .418 (4.53) .371 (2.91)
SD of capital formation .405 (6.00) .162 (1.42)
Divesification of exports index -.300 (-2.76) -.074 (-.99)
SD of openness .210 (5.40) .030 (.53)
SD of aid per capita .262 (3.17) .020 (.31)
Life expectancy at birth -.170 (-2.81) -.099 (-2.91)
R
2 .33 .46 .17 .41 .20 .16 0.72
F-test 20.55 36.06 7.63 29.13 10.06 7.91 13.66
N 4 44 43 84 44 34 43 8
Notes: t-test in parentheses.
Savings and capital formation refer to percentage of GDP.
Diversification index refers to mean of diversification of exports (the higher the better).
Openness refers to exports + imports over GDP.
Table 12: Variables associated with GDP per capita growth volatility - cross country OLS regression
(Dependent variable is standard deviation of GDP per capita growth)
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6. Conclusions 
This paper has described the long-term features of GDP per capita growth in sub-Saharan 
African countries. Our main goal was to identify the relevant cross-section and long-term 
patterns and regularities. The main findings are the following: 
•  Growth has been low and volatile. Africa has grown little over the last three 
decades, and this low growth has helped widen the income gap with other regions. 
Africa has the lowest CV of income per capita, but the highest CV of growth. 
African countries have erratic growth around a low mean. Growth is extremely 
volatile across Africa, and this phenomenon is not restricted to economies with 
any specific economic or geographic attributes. The pervasiveness of growth 
volatility in the region suggests significant spillover and contagion effects 
between countries. Volatility in savings, investments, and openness and low life 
expectancy are among the factors associated with long-run growth volatility in 
Africa  
•  The 1990s may mark a turning point.  It seems that the 1990s marked a shift in 
African economy when the growth rate improved significantly across the 
continent. It is necessary, however, to disentangle the main contributing factors--
whether external factors, productivity growth, investments, better institutions, less 
conflict, or terms of trade growth, among others--or whether the shift reflects a 
structural break toward a more sustainable and inclusive growth pattern. 
•  The cross-country income distribution is becoming less equal. The growth rate is 
converging in Africa and is becoming a more accurate predictor of economic 
performance. This fact is explained mainly by growth convergence between the 
poorest countries. Despite recent improvements in growth performance in many 
poor countries, the richest countries have grown more in the long run, and that has 
increased the income gap. We identified an increasingly stratified distribution of 
income and the formation of clubs, which prevents overall income convergence. 
As a consequence, some growth champions are emerging in Africa, but laggards 
also are becoming more significant. We proposed a typology for grouping 
countries based on relative economic performance that looks useful to describe   41
the long-term economic potential of countries and to predict economic and human 
development outcomes.  
•  Geography and natural resources do not seem to matter for growth. We found 
high and increasing economic diversity in Africa, and no identifiable pattern 
emerged from classifying countries by geography or mineral resources. These 
facts suggest that institutions may play an important role through policies and 
other channels in explaining long-term economic performance. 
•  Initial conditions matter a great deal for income distribution but not for growth. 
Initial conditions seem to be the single-most important factor explaining income 
levels, and this is especially relevant for richer countries. Whatever the channels 
and the mechanics behind this phenomenon, it exerts a strong and persistent 
influence on income determination and on the structure of income between 
countries. We did not find evidence that initial conditions are associated with 
long-run growth. 
Taken together, our results leave us with a puzzle. Low and volatile growth is the 
outstanding defining characteristic of Africa’s growth experience since 1975. But, over 
the long run, we find no evidence that growth volatility is associated with economic 
performance. Considering that volatility is not neutral, this result is unexpected. One 
explanation may be that African countries are in their steady state and that growth 
volatility and economic performance are both symptoms of deeper characteristics, such as 
institutions and initial conditions. A second explanation is that long-term analysis can 
mask important medium-term patterns in a country’s growth. If there are such patterns, it 
may be more relevant and rewarding to look for the causes of growth accelerations and 
decelerations--and what sustains growth--(as proposed by Hausmann, Pritchett, and 
Rodrik [2005]), rather than to investigate the determinants of growth over time and across 
countries. 
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Mean (1975-05) SD (1975-05) CV (1960-05) CV (1975-05)
GDP per capita 533.6 32.8 0.08 0.06
GDP per capita PPP 1,702 108.3 0.06
GDP per capita growth -0.16 1.74 3.44 -11.12
GDP per capita PPP growth -0.17 1.70 -10.01
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Country Index Country Index
  Angola 1.1   Kenya 16.0
  Benin 2.1   Madagascar 8.1
  Burkina Faso 2.2   Malawi 3.0
  Burundi 1.6   Mali 1.3
  Cameroon 4.4   Mauritania 3.8
  Cape Verde 9.2   Mauritius 11.7
  Central African Republic 3.4   Mozambique 2.0
  Chad 2.6   Niger 1.9
  Comoros 1.3   Nigeria 1.3
  Congo, Dem. Rep. of 3.0   Rwanda 2.4
  Congo, Rep. of 1.6   Senegal 12.2
  Equatorial Guinea 1.2   Seychelles 2.7
  Eritrea 5.2   Sierra Leone 3.8
  Ethiopia 4.0   Sudan 1.6
  Gabon 1.6   Tanzania 21.7
  Gambia, The 5.2   Togo 5.3
  Ghana 4.0   Uganda 7.3
  Guinea 4.2   Zambia 5.0
  Guinea-Bissau 4.8   Zimbabwe 8.1
Notes: The index goes from 0 to 100. The higher the better.
Data from OECD.
Table A2: Export diversification index - 2003
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Country Mean SD Country Mean SD
Angola 86.2 30.4 Lesotho 130.6 12.9
Benin 41.9 8.3 Madagascar 30.4 8.3
Botswana 98.6 14.1 Malawi 55.6 9.1
Burkina Faso 25.7 5.1 Mali 41.4 10.2
Burundi 28.5 6.0 Mauritania 69.9 10.2
Cameroon 31.7 6.7 Mauritius 90.9 12.1
Cape Verde 45.4 4.1 Mozambique 38.4 14.4
Central African Republic 24.8 4.5 Namibia 94.0 14.7
Chad 34.1 17.5 Niger 35.0 6.3
Comoros 33.4 6.9 Nigeria 62.5 9.0
Congo, Dem. Rep. 33.8 14.7 Rwanda 23.1 5.1
Congo, Rep. 82.6 24.1 Senegal 51.6 11.1
Cote d'Ivoire 58.8 7.6 Seychelles 80.0 19.5
Equatorial Guinea 117.1 61.2 Sierra Leone 35.1 11.5
Eritrea 77.9 16.5 South Africa 42.2 6.1
Ethiopia 20.0 9.5 Sudan 21.0 8.3
Gabon 68.9 9.5 Swaziland 148.7 13.7
Gambia, The 69.4 16.2 Tanzania 32.5 7.8
Ghana 55.3 16.9 Togo 62.2 13.8
Guinea 42.7 7.7 Uganda 26.6 9.0
Guinea-Bissau 50.2 11.0 Zambia 59.1 8.3
Kenya 42.6 6.2 Zimbabwe 47.3 19.4
Note: Merchandise trade as a share of GDP is the sum of merchandise exports and imports divided
 by the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars.





   49
C o u n t r y 1 9 7 51 9 7 61 9 7 71 9 7 81 9 7 91 9 8 01 9 8 11 9 8 21 9 8 31 9 8 41 9 8 51 9 8 61 9 8 71 9 8 81 9 8 91 9 9 01 9 9 11 9 9 21 9 9 31 9 9 41 9 9 51 9 9 61 9 9 71 9 9 81 9 9 92 0 0 02 0 0 12 0 0 22 0 0 32 0 0 42005
Angola 1,909 1,728 1,667 1,677 1,719 1,725 1,726 1,817 1,874 1,836 1,782 1,709 1,541 1,123 1,127 1,209 1,311 1,382 1,443 1,455 1,462 1,469 1,635 1,641 1,772 2,077
Benin 860 845 863 849 878 909 967 956 883 921 958 947 903 905 850 848 856 858 856 862 872 892 919 933 949 974 991 1,003 1,009 1,008 1,015
Botswana 1,820 1,946 2,107 2,328 2,523 2,731 2,880 3,123 3,419 3,593 3,730 3,913 4,250 4,933 5,423 5,633 5,894 5,911 5,877 5,949 6,074 6,279 6,784 7,374 7,795 8,349 8,724 9,184 9,761 10,354 11,021
Burkina Faso 763 812 798 818 831 821 838 898 881 845 894 944 905 937 918 878 927 904 919 902 918 957 980 963 1,000 986 1,013 1,024 1,056 1,063 1,079
Burundi 738 784 856 829 820 805 875 837 839 812 877 876 894 911 898 907 931 923 851 807 735 670 655 681 666 650 648 659 630 639 622
Cameroon 1,702 1,563 1,726 2,044 2,105 2,005 2,282 2,386 2,481 2,593 2,724 2,824 2,683 2,401 2,290 2,089 1,954 1,842 1,737 1,650 1,663 1,705 1,751 1,800 1,839 1,877 1,923 1,962 2,003 2,039 2,045
Cape Verde .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,409 2,492 2,704 2,922 3,086 3,097 3,112 3,230 3,341 3,289 3,257 3,283 3,429 3,578 3,754 3,813 3,927 4,121 4,373 4,555 4,618 4,717 4,893 4,994 5,162
Central African Republic 1,646 1,698 1,722 1,700 1,616 1,503 1,439 1,505 1,344 1,431 1,449 1,465 1,362 1,356 1,353 1,292 1,253 1,142 1,115 1,140 1,192 1,118 1,152 1,182 1,202 1,209 1,208 1,183 1,079 1,080 1,089
Chad 972 981 983 959 738 679 672 692 782 778 923 861 816 914 930 864 910 954 780 834 819 813 833 864 832 801 855 894 991 1,241 1,270
Comoros .. .. .. .. .. 1,861 1,883 1,951 1,993 2,021 2,014 1,999 1,979 1,980 1,867 1,912 1,762 1,872 1,888 1,751 1,776 1,717 1,749 1,727 1,740 1,718 1,739 1,773 1,779 1,737 1,773
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2,214 2,031 1,982 1,817 1,768 1,753 1,742 1,684 1,660 1,703 1,662 1,690 1,685 1,642 1,571 1,418 1,253 1,079 900 836 817 789 729 704 660 601 574 578 594 615 635
Congo, Rep. 998 977 862 889 947 1,079 1,230 1,473 1,510 1,564 1,497 1,350 1,310 1,290 1,282 1,254 1,244 1,236 1,185 1,085 1,102 1,112 1,069 1,073 1,007 1,055 1,061 1,077 1,053 1,059 1,123
Cote d'Ivoire 2,433 2,623 2,687 2,842 2,775 2,355 2,324 2,220 2,036 1,894 1,896 1,880 1,802 1,756 1,745 1,667 1,614 1,560 1,510 1,478 1,538 1,612 1,658 1,693 1,679 1,582 1,553 1,505 1,459 1,462 1,466
Equatorial Guinea .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,266 1,188 1,209 1,219 1,185 1,201 1,161 1,255 1,301 1,334 1,487 1,875 3,133 3,729 5,149 5,103 5,058 5,813 6,516 7,005 ..
Eritrea .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 804 913 1,104 1,126 1,210 1,277 1,263 1,221 1,022 1,071 1,031 1,046 1,021 986
Ethiopia .. .. .. .. .. .. 909 891 935 886 764 807 897 868 827 814 721 621 723 722 739 806 815 761 791 814 859 841 798 879 938
Gabon 9,323 12,288 10,435 7,696 7,506 7,469 7,614 7,155 7,326 7,632 7,220 6,934 5,561 6,073 6,380 6,496 6,674 6,254 6,205 6,225 6,465 6,606 6,796 6,758 6,188 6,175 6,208 6,100 6,159 6,149 6,187
Gambia, The 1,584 1,646 1,648 1,697 1,622 1,668 1,668 1,602 1,718 1,719 1,644 1,648 1,625 1,633 1,664 1,659 1,650 1,646 1,638 1,585 1,545 1,526 1,547 1,549 1,595 1,631 1,674 1,572 1,634 1,671 1,709
Ghana 1,885 1,783 1,792 1,912 1,827 1,790 1,676 1,507 1,387 1,454 1,478 1,507 1,534 1,575 1,610 1,618 1,656 1,673 1,706 1,716 1,742 1,779 1,811 1,854 1,893 1,920 1,954 1,997 2,056 2,126 2,206
Guinea .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,717 1,728 1,787 1,802 1,818 1,770 1,748 1,744 1,758 1,803 1,834 1,880 1,929 1,978 1,974 2,009 2,048 2,028 2,037 2,060
Guinea-Bissau 1,019 1,030 916 993 973 790 907 923 873 933 950 921 924 942 973 1,002 1,022 1,000 988 988 1,000 1,085 1,124 787 826 863 840 757 739 732 736
Kenya 963 948 1,000 1,030 1,068 1,086 1,084 1,059 1,033 1,012 1,018 1,051 1,075 1,102 1,115 1,124 1,104 1,061 1,033 1,030 1,046 1,062 1,041 1,050 1,050 1,033 1,049 1,032 1,041 1,067 1,103
Lesotho 1,176 1,276 1,519 1,755 1,761 1,669 1,637 1,633 1,539 1,657 1,701 1,677 1,708 1,859 1,982 2,080 2,134 2,205 2,255 2,305 2,377 2,581 2,756 2,597 2,577 2,592 2,662 2,750 2,834 2,927 2,967
Madagascar 1,290 1,217 1,213 1,149 1,228 1,204 1,057 1,009 989 978 961 953 937 942 953 955 869 854 847 822 811 804 809 816 829 843 869 737 788 807 821
Malawi 579 589 597 633 640 623 574 573 578 589 589 557 532 517 497 506 537 491 535 476 548 576 583 589 589 583 541 544 564 591 593
Mali 742 823 855 823 889 831 775 722 738 751 650 688 668 662 722 691 685 723 689 677 700 703 730 754 782 785 854 863 900 892 919
Mauritania 1,963 2,080 1,991 1,933 1,977 1,994 2,013 1,919 1,944 1,837 1,849 1,910 1,904 1,893 1,939 1,861 1,850 1,839 1,900 1,795 1,920 1,978 1,847 1,846 1,914 1,894 1,891 1,856 1,901 1,941 1,988
Mauritius .. .. .. .. .. 4,038 4,170 4,355 4,438 4,513 4,744 5,097 5,528 5,915 6,200 6,511 6,825 7,096 7,406 7,629 7,872 8,196 8,568 8,987 9,391 9,673 10,100 10,286 10,504 10,904 11,312
Mozambique .. .. .. .. .. 706 724 659 544 501 501 488 560 608 645 643 658 582 599 617 616 640 692 762 801 799 885 938 992 1,046 1,105
Namibia .. .. .. .. .. 6,573 6,502 6,347 6,094 5,911 5,743 5,772 5,707 5,489 5,338 5,245 5,462 5,655 5,366 5,582 5,635 5,638 5,702 5,724 5,767 5,838 5,868 6,163 6,295 6,592 6,749
Niger 985 962 1,006 1,107 1,150 1,090 1,064 1,048 968 780 815 840 815 844 826 790 785 711 699 704 699 699 694 741 712 678 701 698 711 687 695
Nigeria 961 1,018 1,047 957 992 1,004 848 823 759 703 751 748 722 770 802 844 859 860 855 833 831 845 846 841 830 854 860 854 924 959 1,003
Rwanda 840 972 959 1,013 1,096 1,156 1,183 1,172 1,208 1,121 1,128 1,138 1,082 1,083 1,058 1,036 1,048 1,187 1,183 627 862 932 974 957 940 931 951 1,012 1,005 1,030 1,073
Senegal 1,468 1,559 1,480 1,388 1,449 1,365 1,313 1,473 1,463 1,364 1,374 1,394 1,406 1,433 1,372 1,385 1,341 1,334 1,270 1,273 1,304 1,337 1,347 1,372 1,420 1,427 1,458 1,440 1,498 1,553 1,594
Seychelles 7,363 8,406 7,753 9,248 10,560 9,984 9,062 8,872 8,643 8,961 9,884 9,797 10,158 10,629 11,727 12,438 12,645 13,379 14,003 13,663 13,302 13,753 15,218 16,177 16,160 16,790 16,404 16,121 15,270 14,815 14,329
Sierra Leone 935 914 898 902 925 951 961 989 950 968 894 880 915 826 811 824 836 675 685 672 616 642 524 511 459 463 527 642 670 691 717
South Africa 9,625 9,631 9,422 9,503 9,649 10,051 10,335 10,041 9,606 9,837 9,469 9,231 9,193 9,353 9,365 9,147 8,869 8,501 8,426 8,514 8,592 8,765 8,793 8,633 8,626 8,764 8,841 9,064 9,229 9,533 9,884
Sudan 1,161 1,313 1,352 1,233 1,134 1,115 1,159 1,187 1,173 1,080 985 1,013 1,132 1,106 1,180 1,092 1,147 1,194 1,219 1,202 1,244 1,286 1,336 1,389 1,445 1,506 1,567 1,636 1,695 1,750 1,853
Swaziland 3,103 2,942 2,879 2,825 2,822 3,075 2,994 2,917 2,888 2,976 2,994 3,260 3,623 3,746 3,962 4,169 4,146 4,066 4,080 4,087 4,111 4,139 4,160 4,162 4,185 4,167 4,150 4,191 4,224 4,258 4,292
Tanzania .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 501 503 520 513 499 488 480 482 491 496 503 509 524 546 573 602 631 662
Togo 1,708 1,634 1,708 1,850 1,708 1,897 1,772 1,646 1,498 1,521 1,547 1,516 1,471 1,516 1,529 1,481 1,432 1,342 1,112 1,246 1,305 1,374 1,517 1,429 1,414 1,358 1,315 1,332 1,332 1,337 1,340
Uganda .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 844 865 834 779 754 755 787 807 829 846 846 887 915 989 1,047 1,068 1,087 1,140 1,167 1,185 1,219 1,234 1,257 1,293
Zambia 1,351 1,387 1,282 1,248 1,172 1,170 1,201 1,130 1,071 1,033 1,015 990 983 1,012 971 938 912 872 907 808 766 799 806 774 774 785 808 820 848 879 910
Zimbabwe 2,784 2,708 2,445 2,306 2,305 2,546 2,759 2,723 2,658 2,505 2,577 2,533 2,470 2,564 2,611 2,710 2,783 2,470 2,442 2,614 2,572 2,793 2,827 2,872 2,738 2,498 2,411 2,289 2,039 1,950 1,813
Median 1,290 1,313 1,480 1,388 1,449 1,586 1,538 1,505 1,463 1,454 1,464 1,465 1,406 1,395 1,363 1,339 1,253 1,236 1,183 1,140 1,209 1,286 1,336 1,372 1,414 1,358 1,315 1,332 1,332 1,337 1,317
Table A4a: Country GDP per capita and median by year
 
   50
Country Country-group
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Angola 000000001100000000000 A A
B e n i n 1111111111111111111111111111111 B B
B o t s w a n a 0000000000000000000000000000000 A A
B u r k i n a  F a s o 1111111111111111111111111111111 B B
B u r u n d i 1111111111111111111111111111111 B B
C a m e r o o n 0000000000000000000000000000000 A A
Cape Verde 00000000000000000000 A A
C e n t r a l  A f r i c a n  R e p u b l i c 0000000011001000011011111111111 A B
C h a d 1111111111111111111111111111111 B B
C o m o r o s 0000000000000000000000000000000 A A
C o n g o ,  D e m .  R e p . 0000000000000000011111111111111 A B
C o n g o ,  R e p . 1111111100011111100111111111111 B B
C o t e  d ' I v o i r e 0000000000000000000000000000000 A A
Equatorial Guinea 11111110000000000 B A
Eritrea 11111111111111 B B
E t h i o p i a 0000001111111111111111111111111 B B
G a b o n 0000000000000000000000000000000 A A
G a m b i a ,  T h e 0000000000000000000000000000000 A A
G h a n a 0000000010000000000000000000000 A A
Guinea 00000000000000000000 A A
G u i n e a - B i s s a u 1111111111111111111111111111111 B B
K e n y a 1111111111111111111111111111111 B B
L e s o t h o 1100000000000000000000000000000 A A
M a d a g a s c a r 1111111111111111111111111111111 B B
M a l a w i 1111111111111111111111111111111 B B
M a l i 1111111111111111111111111111111 B B
M a u r i t a n i a 0000000000000000000000000000000 A A
Mauritius 00000000000000000000000000 A A
Mozambique 11111111111111111111111111 B B
Namibia 00000000000000000000000000 A A
N i g e r 1111111111111111111111111111111 B B
N i g e r i a 1111111111111111111111111111111 B B
R w a n d a 1111111111111111110111111111111 B B
S e n e g a l 0000011101110000000000000000000 A A
S e y c h e l l e s 0000000000000000000000000000000 A A
S i e r r a  L e o n e 1111111111111111111111111111111 B B
S o u t h  A f r i c a 0000000000000000000000000000000 A A
S u d a n 1111111111111111110000000000000 B A
S w a z i l a n d 0000000000000000000000000000000 A A
Tanzania 111111111111111111 B B
T o g o 0000000000000000001000000000000 A A
Uganda 111111111111111111111110 B B
Z a m b i a 0011111111111111111111111111111 B B
Z i m b a b w e 0000000000000000000000000000000 A A
Note: 0 if GDP > median; 1 otherwise.
Period 1 - 1975-1990 Period 2 - 1991-2005
Table A4b: Country-group assignment
 
 
 